Combining theoretical and empirical work, this paper explores the impact of economic shocks on the incidence of social unrest (i.e., mass demonstrations and violent riots) in autocracies. Our theory predicts negative economic shocks to boost unrest since -in bad times -…ghting the regime to reduce the level of resource diversion becomes cheaper.
Introduction
Over the past decade, understanding the determinants of internal warfare has become a central concern for academics and policy makers alike (see, e.g., Blattman and Miguel, 2010 , for a recent overview). 1 So far, however, less attention has been paid to the roots of other forms of internal con ‡icts such as mass demonstrations or violent riots. Yet, exploring the causes of such "social unrest" is important for a variety of reasons. For one, demonstrations and riots -as is the case for internal warfare -disrupt economic activity and hence are an obstacle to economic development, particularly in poor places. 2 A second reason is that, according to conventional wisdom, internal warfare rarely starts all of a sudden but is very often preceded by a chain of smaller events such as mass demonstrations and riots (see, e.g., Labrousse, 1969, for a detailed account of how the "food riots" of 1789, 1830 and 1848 in France turned into bigger con ‡icts). Thus, a better grasp of the forces behind social unrest may help us to better understand the emergence of truly disastrous events like full-blown civil wars.
Although there may be instances in which the line between social unrest and internal warfare is blurry, the distinction is usually very clear. Internal warfare means that at least two organized and armed forces (in most cases regular military forces against insurgents organized as military)
…ght for the control of the state (see, e.g., Fearon, 2008) . Social unrest, on the other hand, is a disturbance of the public peace by a group of people in order to convey their discontent to the government or to oppose certain government action. In accordance with these more modest goals, acts of social unrest tend to require less funding or organizational capacity as compared to attempts to take over the control of the state. In this paper, we make a …rst attempt at analyzing why and how social unrest emerges and dies down in poor autocratic states. The paper o¤ers two main contributions. First, we present a simple theoretical framework of social unrest (i.e., demonstrations or riots) from which we derive a set of predictions. Second, we use a new database on various forms of unrest in Sub-Saharan Africa to test these predictions, thereby carefully addressing causality issues.
Our theoretical framework belongs to the class of rational con ‡ict models in which social unrest may ensue between a constituted elite and the citizenry. We assume that the elite may try to appropriate resources from the citizenry while the latter can resort to social unrest, albeit at a cost, to oppose such a diversion. This setup gives rise to a simple Markovian equilibrium in 1 According to the usual (but not uncontested) de…nition, internal warfare is called a "civil con ‡ict" if it causes at least 25 battle death in a single year and it is called a "civil war" if this number is greater than 1000 (see Blattman and Miguel, 2010) . 2 For anecdotal evidence, see, e.g., an article in The Economist ("A cracked nation holds its breath", January 17, 2008) which describes how the riots that erupted in Kenya in late 2007 imperiled the country's economy. which we observe social unrest primarily in the case of a negative economic shock. A positive economic shocks, in contrast, does only little to reduce the incidence of social unrest. The intuition is that the elite must set the level of diversion before it gets to know the citizenry's income. If the elite expects the economy to remain in a "good" state, it opts for a high level since rioting or demonstrating is expensive if incomes (and hence the opportunity cost) are
high. Yet, if incomes drop due to a "bad" economic shock, the cost of con ‡ict goes downand it becomes suddenly worthwhile for the citizenry to …ght resource diversion. In response to a ‡are-up of unrest, the elite then lowers the level of resource diversion in the subsequent period -and hence calms down the situation.
To assess these predictions empirically, we use a new source of data, the Social Con ‡ict in Africa Database (SCAD). SCAD provides data on various forms of social con ‡ict, among them demonstrations and riots, which are usually not covered in datasets on internal warfare. 3 We further assemble data on weather variation to address the endogeneity of economic variables to con ‡ict. According to Miguel et al. (2004) , natural weather variation is likely to be an important source of income volatility in Sub-Saharan Africa as many countries heavily depend on agricultural production and only a tiny share of the cropland is irrigated. At the same time,
weather variations are truly exogenous to human behavior and should therefore be independent of social con ‡ict. We thus introduce weather variation as an instrument for the GDP per capita (p.c.) in our estimation. 4 However, we con…rm previous results by Miguel and Satyanath (2011) that show little in ‡uence of weather variation on GDP p.c., especially after 2000. We therefore increase the relevance of our instruments by additionally including the (lagged) population growth rate as well as the GDP p.c. growth rate of important trading partners. These variables are usual candidates in the literature as instruments for the GDP p. The results for all speci…cations under consideration are robust and show the predicted patterns. In particular, we …nd a statistically signi…cant negative impact of GDP p.c. changes on the contemporaneous incidence of demonstrations and riots. This holds for all speci…cations, and the parameter estimates remain statistically signi…cant after controlling for endogeneity.
We even see a tendency towards bigger e¤ects when using instrumental variables (IV). In particular, the IV estimates show that a contraction of the GDP p.c. of one standard deviation (7%) leads to about 1:23 additional incidents of social unrest in the average Sub-Saharan country. Moreover, when controlling separately for negative and positive GDP p.c. shocks, we …nd that the relationship between income changes and the incidence of con ‡ict is mainly driven by the negative shocks. Positive income shocks, as predicted by our simple theory, do not seem to have strong e¤ects on the frequency of demonstrations and riots.
By emphasizing that negative economic shocks may spark con ‡ict, our theory is related to models of internal warfare or political transitions. For instance, in the contest models proposed by Chassang and Padro-i-Miquel (2009, 2010) negative transitory shocks decrease the immediate cost of …ghting -but not the discounted present value of victory. The model thus predicts that groups …ght over power after a negative shock since they have less to lose than in periods where generating output is more rewarding. Similarly, in Acemoglu and Robinson's (2001) theory of political change, negative economic shocks may induce democratization because -in bad times -…ghting the autocratic regime is relatively cheap. As result, such regimes might be forced to make concessions when a negative shock hits.
5
In other dimensions, however, there are stark di¤erences. Our theory does not seek to explain big events like civil wars or democratic transitions. We rather explore the occurrence of smaller incidents like demonstrations or riots which may be sparked spontaneously by bad economic shocks. Therefore, our model does not rely on competing groups of about the same strength (as is usual in the literature) but rather assumes an asymmetric distribution of power.
In the present framework, the maximum that can be achieved by rioting is to obtain immediate relief through a temporary reduction in resource diversion; a change in the balance of power, on the other hand, is out of reach. As a result, the elite's response to unrest is not large-scale violence but rather the implementation of measures to alleviate economic distress. This focus on the immediate e¤ects of economic shocks is also re ‡ected in our empirical analysis which looks at the contemporaneous association between changes in the GDP p.c. and the incidence of social con ‡ict. In contrast, the empirical work focusing on bigger events (e.g., Collier and Finally, note that our theory does not only well in terms of explaining the empirical evidence on the incidence of social unrest. It is also consistent with how African governments responded to a recent series of riots. As described by Berazneva and Lee (2011), 14 African countries experienced severe rioting due to soaring food prices (and hence declining real incomes) in the 2007-2008 period. In most of these 14 countries, the government responded by taking measures which dampened the fall in real incomes (e.g., by reducing duties on food imports). This is exactly what the present theory would predict: In order to prevent the riots from going on inde…nitely, the elite does not primarily resort to violence but reduces the diversion of resources and hence limits the fall in the citizenry's real income.
The rest of the paper unfolds as follows. The upcoming section lays out the simple theoretical model while Section 3 presents the econometric approach and the empirical results. In Section 4, we discuss some policy implications and outline a future research agenda.
2 The Model
Assumptions
Agents and preferences. We focus on an in…nite-horizon economy that consists of two players, the elite (E) and the citizenry (N ). 6 The preferences of both players are given by
where u i denotes the concave and non-decreasing instantaneous utility function of player i 2 fE; N g, C i;t refers to consumption of the unique (non-storable) good in period t and 0 < i < 1 is the discount factor. Moreover, we assume that u E (0) = 0:
Endowments. The consumption good is produced by the citizenry only. The output in any given period t is either high (h) or low (l), Y t 2 fY l ; Y h g, where Y h = Y l and 1. Changes in output between two consecutive periods are exogenous. More speci…cally, we assume that Y t = Y t 1 with probability q and Y t 6 = Y t 1 with probability 1 q. Obviously, q is a measure of the persistence in output, and we impose 1 q 1 1= . This assumption, consistent with observations, rules out that dramatic shifts in output happen too frequently. Intuitively, it requires an event that leads to a sharp reduction in output to be more persistent than an event leading to just a mild drop.
The elite controls the state apparatus which, in turn, has the power to extract resources from the citizenry. In what follows, we denote the desired level of resource extraction by T t : We further assume that the elite does not face any limitations when appropriating these resources for its own bene…t. Although stylized, this assumption neatly captures that most governments in Africa face only weak constraints on the allocation of public revenues.
Finally, we assume that the elite has to choose the desired level of resource extraction before it gets to know the current output, Y t (which is disclosed to the elite only in the subsequent period). This is again a very natural assumption in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa where (i) the taxation of businesses often takes the form of costly licenses and permits that have to be acquired before the income is incurred; (ii) many of the regions' administrations lack the institutional capacity to closely monitor the performance of their economies.
7 Social unrest. The desired level of resource extraction, T t ; may not always be implemented.
In particular, we assume that the ability to enforce T t depends on whether the citizenry resorts to social unrest (i.e., demonstrations or riots) or not. In the latter case (R t = 0), the elite is actually able to extract and appropriates T t ; whereas in the former case ( R t = 1) it cannot extract anything (because the "taxation bureaucracy" is paralyzed). Thus, we have
Although the citizenry can avoid resource diversion, it might be reluctant to do so. The reason is that resorting to social unrest is associated with a cost that is given by a fraction of the current output. Thus, the citizenry's level of consumption is given by
Equilibrium concept and time line. The focus is on the (pure strategy) Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE), where strategies depend only on the payo¤-relevant variables. 8 In the present setup, the payo¤-relevant variables are given by the output, Y t 2 fY l ; Y h g; and -for the citizenry -by the desired level of resource extraction, T t .
The timing of events is as follows. First, Y t 1 becomes common knowledge. Second, the elite sets the desired level of resource extraction, T t . Third, the citizenry observes (privately)
Y t and decides whether or not to revolt, R t 2 f0; 1g: Finally, payo¤s realize and the period ends.
7 See Bates (2008) for how "unconstrained" governments emerged in many Sub-Saharan states after independence. On the monitoring issue, see a recent World Bank (2005) report which argues that the lack of unambiguous indicators of economic performance is a key problem in the world's poorest countries. 8 Abstracting from potentially complicated punishment strategies allows us to focus on sharp predictions easily transferable to an empirical setup. It is noteworthy, however, that simple punishment strategies such as "Tit-for-Tat" or "Trigger strategy" do not constitute proper Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria of this game.
Analysis
Decision on R. It is convenient to look …rst at the citizenry's decision on whether or not to resort to social unrest. Recall that the citizenry's best response depends only on the payo¤-relevant variables Y t and T t . Remember further that, in period t, Y t is private information to the citizenry but will be disclosed to the elite in the subsequent period, before deciding on T t+1 .
Thus, the citizenry's decision on R t has no implications for subsequent decisions as it does not alter the elite's set of information when deciding on T t+1 . As a result, the maximization of lifetime utility (1) is achieved by maximizing current consumption (3) in every single period.
In this regard, it is straightforward to verify that R t = 0 gives the highest level of consumption, and thus utility, if and only if T t Y t . Therefore, the maximum level of resource extraction that just avoids social unrest, b T t ; is given by
Put di¤erently, the citizenry opts for R t = 1 if and only if the desired level of resource extraction, T t , happens to exceed the critical threshold b T t :
Note that b T t is smaller when the output is low. The reason is that the cost of revolting is proportional to Y t and hence is smaller in times of low economic activity. Thus, in these times, the bene…t of …ghting the government exceed the cost of revolting at lower threshold.
Decision on T . We now move one step backwards and look at the elite's decision on resource extraction. Obviously, when deciding on T t , the elite takes the citizenry's expected response into account. Yet, the fact that the elite cannot observe Y t at the time of the citizenry's decision precludes any implementation of a state-contingent scheme (such as "pay
otherwise"). The elite, however, might want to elicit information on Y t from the citizenry. Yet, as the following proposition states, no mechanism inducing truthful revelation can be sensitive to the announcement of the citizenry (which is a well known result in the mechanism design literature).
Proposition 1 As long as T t is increasing (decreasing) in the announcement of the citizenry,
there exists no equilibrium in pure strategy in which the citizenry announces that the current
Proof. See Appendix.
The conclusion so far is that the optimal level of resource extraction can or should neither depend on the actual realization of Y t nor on any announcements by the citizenry in this regard.
It is further straightforward to see that no other values of T t than b T l or b T h are candidates for maximizing the elite's current expected instantaneous utility: A level of T t below b T l cannot be utility-maximizing since it could be increased to b T l without inducing the risk of a revolt; a level in between b T l and b T h cannot be utility-maximizing either because T t could be raised to b T h without increasing the probability of revolt; …nally, a level above b T h can be ruled out because it would lead to a revolt with certainty. On the basis of these results, the following proposition establishes that, in each period t; the elite solves the simple "binary" decision problem
It further derives the elite's policy function.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the citizenry's policy function is given by (4). Then, the elite's optimal decision rule is given by
Thus, to summarize, the MPE in this economy is represented by the policy functions (4) and, depending on the persistence in output, (6) or (7).
Discussion
Economic activity and social unrest. After having established the equilibrium, it remains to discuss the relationship between economic activity and social unrest. By looking at the de…nition of b T t and policy function (4) , it becomes clear that -in any given period t -there will not be demonstrations or riots if T t = b T l ; moreover, the citizenry stays calm if
The only constellation that gives rise to unrest is
Yet, when does this constellation emerge? It is easy to see that it requires The reason for the emergence of social unrest in equilibrium is that the elite does not exactly know about the output in the economy and hence the extent to which resources can be diverted without sparking resistance. Thus, announcing a high level of diversion is always risky -but the elite is prepared to take this "risk" if the economy has been booming (i.e., if
and is likely to boom in the current period as well (i.e., if q is high). In this case, claiming b T h (and receiving this amount with probability q) brings the elite a higher expected utility than getting b T l with certainty. As a result, the economy sees demonstrations and riot only in the event of an (unlikely) economic downturn.
Linking theory and evidence. Due to the simplicity of our baseline model, the number of demonstrations or riots in a given period is a binary variable while, in practice, incidents of social unrest are measured as counts per year. It turns out, however, that the model can easily be extended to allow for more than one instance of social unrest per period. To see this, assume that the economy consists of two symmetric sub-economies, A and B: Assume further that these two sub-economies host their own citizenries which produce output levels of Y A;t and Y B;t so that the aggregate output is given by
Both output levels are assumed to follow the process described above but are taken to be independent from each other. Finally, suppose that the elite can set the desired level of resource diversion separately for each sub-economy (and we denote these levels -which are announced simultaneously -by T A;t and T B;t ); similarly, the two citizenries decide independently on whether or not to resort to social unrest (and their decisions -which are also taken simultaneously -are denoted by R A;t and R B;t ). All other assumptions remain intact.
Obviously, in this economy, the total number of instances of unrest per period,
is either zero, one, or two. Moreover, it turns out that larger drops in aggregate output tend to go hand in hand with a higher number of instances. To see this in a simple way, assume that the elite's instantaneous utility function is linear (so that the level of resource diversion in one sub-economy is chosen independently of the state of the other one). Then, the results derived above hold for each of the two sub-economies separately. As a result, the relationship between we have Y t = 0 and R t = 1: Figure 2 here between EfR t g and Y t would remain, however.
Empirics

Data
The data we are using come from several sources. Information on social unrest in Africa stems from a new dataset provided by the SCAD project. 10 SCAD lists di¤erent types of social unrest starting from 1990 for all African countries with a population size of more than 1 million. Among other things, the dataset contains detailed information on the number of spontaneous and organized demonstrations and spontaneous and organized violent riots. We 9 If we did not assume linear utility, the condition on q would be somewhat more involved. 1 0 Available at: www.scaddata.org. For further information see (Hendrix and Salehyan, 2010) aggregate these numbers to …nd the total number of demonstrations, riots, and instances of social unrest in a given country and year. One particular advantage for the empirical analysis of demonstrations and riots is the more continuous nature of the phenomenon. In contrast to internal warfare, which is measured as binary responses at the country level, incidents of social unrest like demonstrations and riots may occur multiple times during a year and are therefore measured as counts for each country. Real GDP p.c. and population data are taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI) provided by the World Bank.
In order to address the potential endogeneity of the GDP p.c., we included additional variables that serve as instruments in later regressions. Among these additional variables are weather conditions, population growth rates, and GDP p. Table 1 .
Econometric Approach
Speci…cations. The basic prediction of the theoretical model developed in the previous section is that -as illustrated by Figure 2 -the level of social unrest in a given country i and period t is negatively related to the change in the country's output (per head) over the previous period. We now test this prediction, thereby allowing for country-speci…c levels of social unrest and time-speci…c shocks that hit all countries in a common way. The basic regression equation to be estimated is thus
where R is a measure of the level of social unrest, Y stands for the change in log real GDP p.c. (i.e., Y it = ln pcGDP it ln pcGDP it 1 ' GDP p.c. growth rate), and , , and represent country-speci…c e¤ects, year-speci…c e¤ects and the error term, respectively.
To check for robustness, we also estimated alternative speci…cations of (8) . These include a speci…cation using random trends/country-speci…c time trends ( P i trend t i ) instead of year dummies t (as in Miguel et al., 2004 ) and a dynamic speci…cation of the form R it = + s R it 1 + y Y it + i + t + i;t (as in Ciccone, 2011). 13 Moreover, we will perform two robustness checks which address speci…c features of our dependent and independent variables. First, to account for potential mean reversion (see, e.g., Ciccone, 2011), we estimate (8) using as a measure of output changes the percentage deviation to the moving average of the last three years of GDP p.c. as this smoothes the series. 1 3 A further alternative speci…cation that we estimate relies on the growth of social unrest relative to the country mean as the dependent variable. The reason is that countries may respond di¤erently in terms of magnitude to a given income shock depending on their average level of social unrest or the size of the country. The reader can …nd the results in Panel B of Table 6 in Appendix A.2. The results are globally robust to this alternative speci…cation, with slightly higher standard errors.
In formal terms, this alternative measure is given by
. Second, we estimate a conditional …xed e¤ects poisson and negative binomial model to account for the count data structure of the dependent variable. Addressing endogeneity. The main challenge when analyzing the causal e¤ect of income shocks on the level of social unrest is to account for endogeneity of almost any kind. It may not only be that current and past incidents of social unrest a¤ect income (reverse causation) but also that third factors in ‡uence both income and social unrest at the same time (omitted variable bias). The resulting biases would be incorporated in the parameter estimate for and therefore interfere with the true e¤ect income shocks have on social unrest. In order to correct for potential endogeneity of income shocks in equation (8), we therefore apply IV and GMM estimation using di¤erent external and internal instruments. The internal instruments are based on the work by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano (1995) , and Blundell and Bond (1998). The external instruments -which are discussed in detail below -include precipitation, lagged population growth, and the GDP p.c. growth rates of the most important trade partners of country i in year t. We prefer to use several external instruments as this allows us to maximize their relevance for the GDP p.c. and to test the resulting overidentifying restrictions.
According to Miguel et al. (2004), Brückner and Ciccone (2011), and Burke and Leigh (2009), variation in weather conditions is a very important determinant of income volatility in
Sub-Saharan Africa as many countries heavily depend on agriculture. Moreover, such variations are truly exogenous to human behavior and should therefore be independent of social con ‡icts.
As a result, weather conditions are popular candidate instruments for the GDP p.c. in many circumstances. However, Kudamatsu et al. (2010) argue that weather conditions may in ‡uence con ‡ict not only through income but also through health conditions. In this case, weatherrelated information might not be an adequate instrument for GDP p.c. To account for this potential problem, we include several indicators for extreme weather events like the number of periods with extreme temperatures, droughts, storms, and ‡oods in our equation of interest when using IVs. The idea is to avoid that our weather variables, e.g., through extreme events 1 4 There is evidence for overdispersion in our data, see Table 1. in the …rst stage regression, in ‡uence con ‡ict in other ways than through GDP p.c. Put di¤erently, we ensure that our instrumental variables reproduce "usual" variations of weather conditions. However, we con…rm previous results by Miguel and Satyanath (2011) in …nding that weather seems to be a rather poor instrument in terms of relevance.
To increase the relevance of our instruments, we additionally include the lagged population growth rate and the GDP p.c. growth rate of important trade partners. Population growth is known to be an important determinant of GDP growth (see, e.g., Galor Again, we assume that trade partner j's GDP p.c. growth rate is independent of social unrest in country i but in ‡uences changes in the GDP p.c. in country i.
The …rst-stage estimates are shown in Table 2 . The table documents that weather conditions are rather weak instruments for GDP p.c changes (see also Miguel and Satyanath, 2011) .
Precipitation turns out to be of relevance for GDP p.c. only after expanding the functional form, controlling for the type of land use, and accounting for lagged e¤ects as done in column 4. 16 Moreover, we …nd only little evidence for temperature to in ‡uence GDP p.c. in our dataset. In contrast, there is little doubt that the …rst lag of the population growth rate is important, especially in terms of relevance when explaining variations in GDP p.c., as can be seen by the economically and statistically highly signi…cant estimate (columns 5 and 7).
The average GDP p.c. growth of the …ve most important trade partners proves to be a valid instrument as well (columns 6 and 7) but has a rather small e¤ect on the domestic GDP p.c.
Finally, note that there is no evidence for lagged or nonlinear e¤ects in case of population growth or GDP p.c. growth of the most important trade partners. 
Results
Baseline estimation results. Table 3 presents the main empirical results relying on approaches which do not address the potential endogeneity problem. The results for all speci…cations are robust and show the expected patterns. In particular, we …nd a negative and statistically signi…cant impact of the …rst di¤erence of the real GDP p.c. (GDP (FD) ) on the level of social unrest. This holds for all speci…cations, including the linear ones (Table 3 , Panel A), the count data speci…cations (Table 3 , Panel B), and the dynamic speci…cation (Table 3 (Table 3 , Panel C, columns 4-6). In particular, we included three dummies for GDP p.c. changes, where GDP 25 re ‡ects severe negative shocks, GDP 50 stands for moderate negative changes, and GDP 75 stands for exceptional positive shocks. 17 The resulting pattern is unambiguous: Severe negative income shocks increase the prevalence of social unrest, especially for riots with, estimates ranging from 0:6 to 1:3.
IV estimation results. The empirical results presented in the Tables 3 and 5 should be interpreted with caution as the main explanatory variable, changes in the GDP p.c., may su¤er from di¤erent types of endogeneity in the present setting. To address this problem, we rely on several external instruments, including precipitation, population growth, and the economic conditions of important trade partners. The results can be found in Table 4 (while the GMM estimates relying on internal instruments are shown in Appendix A.2, Table 7 ).
In line with what one would expect, standard errors increase compared to the benchmark results but the parameter estimates remain statistically signi…cant, at least when we increase the relevance of our set of instruments. Moreover, we …nd a tendency towards even more economically signi…cant e¤ects of GDP p.c. changes. 18 The estimates of the impact of GDP Note that the estimates we obtain when restricting our set of instruments to weather conditions are close to the ones suspected to be endogenous. However, when lagged population growth and GDP p. In Table 4 Table 4 , Panel A, columns 1-3). However, when using lagged population growth, GDP p.c. growth of important trade partners, or all instruments together, the Null is rejected. For the Hansen (1982) test of overidentifying restrictions, we never …nd evidence against the Null of the validity of the instruments for any speci…cation. As one might suspect that lagged Table 2 ). Using lagged p opulation growth as instrum ent (colum ns 4 -6). Panel B: Using GDP p.c.
growth of im p ortant trade partners as instrum ent (colum ns 1 -3). Using all instrum ents (colum ns 4 -6, see colum n 7 in Table 2 ).
population growth is not fully exogenous in our setup, we additionally report a di¤erence-inHansen statistic to test for its orthogonality. By looking at the p-values displayed in Table 4 , Panel B, columns 4-6, we do not …nd any evidence against the validity of the instrument.
Finally, on a side note, we also …nd the suspected direct e¤ects of extreme weather conditions on con ‡ict (Kudamatsu et al., 2010) . Especially ‡oods, and to a lesser extend droughts, seem to in ‡uence both the GDP p.c. and social unrest (see Table 4 ). 19 
Discussion and Conclusions
Mass demonstrations and violent riots are widespread forms of social unrest in developing countries. There is no doubt that such incidents disrupt commerce and -if recurring frequently -may even impede long-run economic growth. Guided by a simple theoretical framework, this paper explores the roots of social unrest in Africa. Exploiting a new dataset, our empirical analysis suggests that negative income shocks are an important driving force of demonstrations and riots. In particular, our instrumental variables estimates identify a negative relationship between the change in the GDP p.c. (from t 1 to t) and the contemporaneous incidence of social unrest. Interestingly, we further …nd that this negative relationship is mainly driven by economic downturns: While strong negative shocks increases the incidence of social unrest, positive changes in income do little to promote stability.
The apparent asymmetry in the impact of positive and negative shocks is a reason for concern. It implies that a higher volatility in GDP p.c. growth (e.g., due to more volatile weather conditions or a higher incidence of income shocks a¤ecting important trade partners) leads to more demonstrations and riots. So our empirical …ndings suggest that climate change, by promoting greater variability in weather conditions, is likely to increase the level of social unrest in Africa. As a result, at least via the social-unrest channel, climate change should be expected to reduce the region's growth prospects. This prediction, in turn, has a number of clear policy implications. First, it implies that governments should reinforce measures to alleviate the impact of exogenous shocks on domestic incomes. For instance, better irrigation of arable land would mitigate the negative impact of extreme weather events (like droughts) on agricultural production and hence incomes. As a result, economic downturns su¢ ciently powerful to spark social unrest might become highly infrequent. Second, governments should improve the measurement of economic activity. If the measurement were more accurate and contemporary, the authorities would quickly learn about a fall in income -and could reduce the burden imposed on the citizenry early enough to prevent a disruptive ‡aring up of social unrest. Finally, to address the root of the problem, a complaisant government would have to put in place measures that would prevent the state apparatus from diverting a lot of resources in good times. If that were achieved, the incentives to oppose resource diversion would be too weak -even if the economy were hit by a negative economic shock.
By o¤ering new theoretical insights and empirical results, the present paper gives also rise to a number of new questions that would be interesting to address. For instance, anecdotal evidence suggests that "bigger events"like internal warfare or regime change are often preceded by periods of social unrest (while, of course, not all periods of social unrest lead to internal warfare and regime change). So an obvious question would be whether we …nd such correlations in cross-country data. Similarly, it would be of obvious importance to have a model that would allow us to explore the circumstances under which social unrest is more or less likely to escalate into such bigger events. Addressing these questions would help to …ll the void between research on social unrest and the literature on civil war or regime change. At the moment, we leave these questions to future research. •
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